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The Long and Winding Doctrine: by
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| The Long and Winding Doctrine:
Social Contract |
The Long and Winding Doctrine: Social
Contract The Doctrine of Social Contract Rulers have claimed a variety of justifications for their authority. Some have claimed it as a matter of Divine Right. Some have professed an inherent superiority over their subjects and a consequent authority. Others have suggested that leadership is a duty, done for the good of those from whom they exacted obedience. In recent centuries, rulers have begun to claim that their powers are given to them willingly by the people and that they rule in the people's name. That claim is based on the idea that all political power derives from the people and that governments exercise only powers delegated to them by the people. Men have been struggling toward an understanding of this doctrine for quite some time. Over 2200 years ago, Aristotle observed in Politics, (Book 3, Chapter 14) that "... kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects, but tyrants over involuntary; and the one are guarded by their fellow-citizens, the others are guarded against them." The 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) gave
considerable thought to the doctrine.
Hobbes made in his statement of the doctrine an arbitrary and incorrect distinction between "the strong" and "the sovereign." Indeed, the sovereign in Hobbes' philosophy was nothing more than the most successful of the strong. Hobbes believed government to have originated by the voluntary actions
of men but viewed opposition to government as treason.
Since the contract according to Hobbes was irrevocable, those men who entered into it didn't gain anything. They remained weak and under the domination of the strong. What they lost was their right to oppose the strong. The authors of the Mayflower Compact (1620) appear to have considered
King James to have been unconditionally sovereign.
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Social Contract A different view was expressed by John Locke (1632-1704), in the latter part of the 17th century. Locke advocated not only that governments operated with powers that were voluntarily delegated, but that government could exercise only those powers. He advocated the sovereignty of the people.
Locke also believed that the rights of men were superior to the powers of government, and that opposition to government was a right of the people.
Thus, Locke's view was that government is a tool of the people to be used or discarded by them as they choose. In the Declaration of Rights of 1774, the American colonists implied
that the sovereignty of a king was predicated upon powers ceded to him
by the people.
They still didn't properly understand the concept for if a king is sovereign then he doesn't rely upon delegated powers. On the other hand, if the people are sovereign then they do not cede powers to a sovereign king but to an agent of the people whose job it is to carry out their will. Less than two years later, the writers of the Declaration of Independence
made a better statement of the doctrine.
Those writers understood the confrontation between the rights of the people and the powers of government. One remark particularly reveals their views regarding the Doctrine of Social Contract. That remark is with regard to the legislative power.
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The Long and Winding Doctrine: Social
Contract That is a clear statement of the opinion that the powers of government, when terminated, revert to their origins, that is, to the people. After the Declaration of Independence, the clear vision of sovereign
people was lost. Sovereignty was assigned to the states in the Articles
of Confederation.
In the U.S. Constitution, sovereignty was denied even to the states.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution drove the final nail into the coffin of the sovereignty of the people.
To be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States means to be under its authority and control.
Since the formation of the U.S. government, the people haven't had any sovereignty at all. Instead, sovereignty has been exclusively a tool of central governments. For over two hundred years, the Doctrine of Social Contract has been obstructed by the very authority it was intended to prevent.
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The Long and Winding Doctrine:
Social Contract
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The Long and Winding Doctrine: Social
Contract Government Although constitutions have not caused a reduction in the powers of government, they have changed the fundamental nature of government. A government based only on the whims, desires, or authority of a ruler is merely an extension of that ruler. However, a government based on a constitution embodies all of the defining characteristics of a corporation. Bouvier's article corporation contains the following:
The pedigree of constitutional government identifies it as a corporation.
When you recognize the similarities between constitutional governments and other kinds of corporations, then all of the pieces fall into place.
The same is true of governments which, under the Doctrine of Social Contract, are created by sovereign people. A corporation is defined by its charter or act of incorporation.
A constitutional government is defined by its constitution, which serves as the charter or act of incorporation. The constitution describes the objectives, powers, duties, and limits of the government, just as the charter of incorporation does for other corporations. Constitutions are defined similarly to charters or acts of incorporation.
Most corporations consist of officers, employees, and stockholders, as well as various kinds of property. In most corporations, the voting stockholders elect the officers of a board of directors, which includes a chief executive officer. Those officers then exercise authority in the name of the voting stockholders. They hire or appoint various employees to do the work of running the corporation and to manage its property. While doing so, they remain answerable to the voting stockholders.
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Social Contract In a constitutional government, the voters usually elect a legislative body and a chief executive officer. Those elected officials then exercise authority in the name of the voters. They hire or appoint various bureaucrats and employees to do the work of running the government and to manage its property. While doing so, they remain answerable to the voters. The only intrinsic parties to the contract represented by a charter of incorporation are the stockholders, the officers, and the employees. Only by an express act of consent can someone else become a party to such a contract. Similarly, the only intrinsic parties to the contract represented by a constitution are the voters, the elected or appointed officers, and the various employees and bureaucrats. Only by an express act of consent can any other individual become a party to a constitution. The Doctrine of Social Contract not only is completely consistent with this view of governments as corporations, but requires it. This leads to a new insight into the relationship between the people
and the government. The Doctrine of Social Contract defines the residence
of sovereignty. The corporate character of constitutional government
identifies the parties from whom the government can expect obligations.
The result is the realization that the legitimate boundaries of lawful
government are not geographical, but contractual. This deceptively
simple idea has profound and far reaching implications. Indeed, it
is the most important political statement that has ever been made.
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The Long and Winding Doctrine: Social
Contract Some Consequences If the legitimate boundaries of lawful government are not geographical,
but contractual, then certain consequences must follow. One of them
is already obvious. A government can have lawful authority only over
individuals who are parties to the contract. This consequence requires
a change in our understanding of participation in government. Such
participation must be understood in terms of the laws of contracts.
This means that no group of men, however large, can rightfully compel another group of men, however small, into a contract. Similarly, no group of men, however large, can rightfully compel another group of men, however small, into a government. When that is done, those compelled are not citizens. They are slaves. There are very few ways in which an individual can become a party to a contract of government and, thereby, come voluntarily under the lawful jurisdiction of such a government. He can voluntarily become a voter. He can voluntarily run for office and be elected. He can voluntarily be hired into the service of the government. He might also, for some reason or other, execute some other contract with the government that might include in its provisions an obligation to some jurisdiction of the government. Marriage licenses, driver's licenses, and business licenses are present examples of such contracts. An individual can volunteer into the jurisdiction of the United States of America1 by declaring himself to be a citizen. Any such voluntary actions make an individual a party to a contract and allow legitimate obligations to accrue. Conversely, if an individual isn't a party to a contract, then the government doesn't have any jurisdiction over him. Any enforcement of the authority of a government on any such individual is an act of aggression by that government. The instant that such aggression occurs, the government departs from the Doctrine of Social Contract and becomes a despotism. Since the legitimate boundaries of lawful government under the Doctrine
of Social Contract are not geographical, but contractual, any such government
may extend anywhere in the world where there is an individual under its
jurisdiction or where it owns property. However, that government
exists there only with regard to that individual or to that property.
Many such gov-
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| The Long and Winding Doctrine:
Social Contract ernments might exist within the same geographical region, enjoying many possible kinds of coexistence. The practical consequences of this view of government are many.
Any number of people greater than one might form such a government simply
by asserting their sovereignty. National boundaries as they are presently
understood are not supported by the Doctrine of Social Contract.
Commonly accepted legislation with regard to franchises, smuggling, and
naturalization is incompatible with the Doctrine of Social Contract.
If governments really operated according to the Doctrine of Social Contract,
then wars would be very difficult to administer and weapons of mass destruction
would make even less sense than they do now, if such a thing is possible.
Each particular government would be useful or it would cease to exist.
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The Long and Winding Doctrine: Social
Contract Imagine Some time before or during the Middle Ages, men began their efforts to convert governments from those based on the sovereignty of the monarch to those based on the sovereignty of the people. In historical terms, that process isn't very far advanced. While most governments in the world today make a pretense of acknowledging the sovereignty of their people, none of them behave as if it is actually true. They display their various constitutions and broadcast the rhetoric of human rights but rigidly maintain their geographical boundaries and forcibly control the people within those boundaries. An example of that inconsistency can be found in the State of California,
where the sovereignty of the people is acknowledged.
Most state constitutions have some such verbiage. However, it's ignored by the actual operation of government at the local level. Consider Black's definition of a municipal corporation.
Some of the rhetoric and apparatus of governments has thus undergone a change that is not reflected by the functions and behavior of governments. That's why elections, which allegedly exert the will of the people, have so little real effect on the actions of governments. Present governments continue to exercise the ancient powers of the despot, disguised by the recent apparatus of the Social Contract. If the Doctrine of Social Contract is to be considered valid, then we
must learn a radically different world view. We must acquire a fundamentally
different understanding of the relationship between governments and people
and of the relationships between and among individuals. Governments
continue to behave the way they do because people have not yet learned
to understand the Doctrine of Social Contract, their obligations under
it, or their ability to legitimately forego those obligations. Today,
the struggle toward understanding continues as men dispute old notions,
trying to imagine a better world. We're in a long transition at the
end of which, if it's completed, our descendents will be free and sovereign
adults. Along the way, there will be a lot of government to overcome
and a lot of human nature to somehow accommodate. The end isn't yet
in sight and might be centuries away. Meanwhile, to sustain us in
the struggle, we have the legacy of the past, the strength of our convictions,
and the example of the dreamers. We also have the dream.
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The Long and Winding Doctrine:
Social Contract
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The Long and Winding Doctrine: Social
Contract Glossary CONSTITUTION. The fundamental law of a state, directing the principles upon which the government is founded, and regulating the exercise of the sovereign powers, directing to what bodies or persons those powers shall be confided and the manner of their exercise. Constitution, in the former law of the European continent, signified as much as decree, -a decree of importance, especially ecclesiastical decrees. The decrees of the Roman emperors referring to the jus circa sacra, contained in the Code of Justinian, have been repeatedly collected and called the Constitutions. The famous bull Unigenitus was usually called in France the Constitution. Comprehensive laws or decrees have been called constitutions; thus, the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina, which is the penal code decreed by Charles V. for Germany, the Constitutions of Clarendon (q.v.). In political law the word constitution came to be used more and more for the fundamentals of a government, - the laws and usages which give it its characteristic feature. We find, thus, former English writers speak of the constitution of the Turkish empire. These fundamental laws and customs appeared to our race especially important where they limited the power and action of the different branches of government; and it came thus to pass that by constitution was meant especially the fundamental law of a state in which the citizen enjoys a high degree of civil liberty; and, as it is equally necessary to guard against the power of the executive in monarchies, a period arrived - namely, the first half of the present century - when Europe, and especially on the continent, the term constitutional government came to be used in contradistinction to absolutism. We now mean by the term constitution, in common parlance, the fundamental law of a free country, which characterizes the organism of the country and secures the rights of the citizen and determines his main duties as a freeman. Sometimes, indeed, the word constitution has been used in recent times for what otherwise is generally called an organic law. Napoleon I. styled himself Emperor of the French by the Grace of God and the Constitutions of the Empire. Constitutions were generally divided into written and non-written constitutions, analogous to leges scriptae and non scriptae. These terms do not indicate the distinguishing principle; Lieber, therefore, divides political constitutions into accumulated or cumulative constitutions and enacted constitutions. The constitution of ancient Rome and that of England belong to the first class. The latter consists of the customs, statutes, common laws, and decisions of fundamental importance. The Reform act is considered by the English a portion of the constitution as much as the trial by jury or the representative system, which have never been enacted, but correspond to what Cicero calls leges natae. Our constitutions are enacted; that is to say, they were, on a certain day and by a certain authority, enacted as a fundamental law of the body politic. In many cases enacted constitutions cannot be dispensed with, and they have certain advantages which cumulative constitutions must forego; while the latter have some advantages which the former cannot obtain. It has been thought, in many periods, by modern nations, that enacted constitutions and statutory law alone are firm guarantees of rights and liberties. This error has been exposed in Lieber's Civil Liberty. Nor can enacted constitutions dispense with the "grown law" (lex nata). For the meaning of much that an enacted constitution establishes can only be found by the grown law on which it is founded, just as the British Bill of Rights (an enacted portion of the English constitution) rests on the common law. Enacted constitutions may be either octroyed, that is, granted
by the presumed full authority of the grantor, the monarch; or they
may be enacted by a sovereign people prescribing high rules of action and
fundamental laws for its political society, such as ours is; or they
may rest on contracts between contracting parties, - for instance, between
the people and a dynasty, or between several states. We cannot enter
here into the interesting inquiry concerning the points on which all modern
constitutions agree, and regarding which they differ, - one of the most
instructive inquiries for the publicist and jurist. See Hallam's
Constitutional History of England; Story on the Constitution;
Sheppard's Constitu-
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Social Contract tional Text-Book; Elliot's Debates on the Constitution, etc.; Lieber's article (Constitution), in the Encyclopedia Americana; Rotteck's article Constitution, in the Staats-Lexicon, 2d ed. — Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1889
despotism, n. 1. Absolute power; authority unlimited and uncontrolled by constitution or laws, and depending alone on the will of the ruler. 2. An arbitrary government; the rule of a despot; absolutism; autocracy. 3. Figuratively, absolute power or influence of any kind. Such is the despotism of the imagination over uncultivated minds. -Macaulay. — Webster's Universal Dictionary
of the English Language and Complete Atlas of the World, 1910 DURESS. Personal restraint, or fear of personal injury or imprisonment. 2 Metc. Ky. 445. Duress of imprisonment exists where a man actually loses his liberty. If a man be illegally deprived of his liberty until he sign and seal a bond, or the like, he may allege this duress and avoid the bond; 2 Bay, 211; 9 Johns. 201; 10 Pet. 137; 26 Barb. 122. But if a man be legally imprisoned, and, either to procure his discharge, or on any other fair account, seal a bond or a deed, this is not by duress of imprisonment, and he is not at liberty to avoid it; Co. 2d Inst. 482; 3 Caines, 168; 6 Mass. 511; 1 Lev. 69; 1 H. & M. 350; 17 Me. 338; 18 How. 307; 2 Wash. C. C. 180. Where the proceedings at law are a mere pretext, the instrument may be avoided; Al. 92; 1 Bla. Com. 136. Duress per minas, which is either for fear of loss of life, or else for fear of mayhem or loss of limb, must be upon a sufficient reason; 1 Bla. Com. 131. In this case, a man may avoid his own act. Lord Coke enumerates four instances in which a man may avoid his own act by reason of menaces: - for fear of loss of life; of member; of mayhem; of imprisonment; Co. 2d Inst. 483; 2 Rolle, Abr. 124; Bacon, Abr. Duress, Murder, A; 2 Stra. 856; Foster, Cr. Law, 322; 2 Ld. Raym. 1578; Savigny, Dr. Rom. § 114. It has been held that restraint of goods under circumstances of hardship will avoid a contract; 2 Bay, 211; 9 Johns. 201; 10 Pet. 137. But see 2 Metc. Ky. 445; 2 Gall. 337; 8 Ct. Cl. 461; 50 Ala. 437. The violence or threats must be such as are calculated to operate on a person of ordinary firmness and inspire a just fear of great injury to person, reputation, or fortune. See 4 Wash. C. C. 402; 39 Me. 559. The age, sex, state of health, temper, and disposition of the party, and other circumstances calculated to give greater or less effect to the violence of threats, must be taken into consideration; 32 Am. Rep. 180, n.; 1 Ky. Law Rep. 137. Violence or threats are cause of nullity, not only where they are exercised on the contracting party, but when the wife, the husband, the descendants or ascendants, of the party are the object of them. If the violence used be only a legal constraint, or the threats only of doing that which the party using them had a right to do, they shall not invalidate the contract. A just and legal imprisonment, or threats of any measure authorized by law and the circumstances of the case, are of this description. See Norris Peake's Ev. 440, and the cases cited, also, 6 Mass. 506, for the general rule at common law. But the mere forms of law to cover coercive proceedings for an unjust and illegal cause, if used or threatened in order to procure the assent to a contract, will invalidate it; and arrest without cause of action, or a demand of bail in an unreasonable sum, or threat of such proceeding, by this rule invalidates a contract made under their pressure. All the above articles relate to cases where there may be some other motive besides the violence or threats for making the contract. When, however, there is no other cause for making the contract, any threats, even of slight injury, will invalidate it. Excessive charges paid to railroad companies refusing to carry or deliver
goods, unless these payments were made voluntary, have been recovered on
the ground of duress; 27 L. J. Ch. 137;
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The Long and Winding Doctrine: Social
Contract 32 id. 225; 31 id. 1; 30 L. J. Exch. 361; 28 id. 169. See, generally, 2 Watts, 167; 1 Bail. 84; 6 Mass. 511; 6 N. H. 508; 2 Gall. 337. — Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1889
lawful - .... Further, the word "lawful" more clearly implies an ethical content than does "legal." The latter goes no further than to denote compliance, with positive, technical, or formal rules; while the former usually imports a moral substance or ethical permissibility .... — Black's Law Dictionary, 1979
LICENSE (Lat. licere, to permit). In Contracts. A permission. A right given by some competent authority to do an act which without such authority would be illegal .... — Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1889
Municipal corporation. A legal institution formed by charter from sovereign (i.e. state) power erecting a populous community of prescribed area into a body politic and corporate with corporate name and continuous succession and for the purpose and with the authority of subordinate self-government and improvement and local administration of affairs of state. A body corporate consisting of the inhabitants of a designated area created by the legislature with or without the consent of such inhabitants for governmental purposes, possessing local legislative and administrative power, also power to exercise within such area so much of the administrative power of the state as may be delegated to it and possessing limited capacity to own and hold property and to act in purveyance of public conveniences. Municipal corporation is a body politic and corporate, created to administer the internal concerns of the district embraced with its corporate limits, in matters peculiar to such place and not common to the state at large. Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 540 P.2d 499, 502. A municipal corporation has a dual character, the one public and the other private, and exercises correspondingly twofold functions and duties - one class consisting of those acts performed by it in exercise of delegated sovereign powers for benefit of people generally, as arm of state, enforcing general laws made in pursuance of general policy of the state, and the other consisting of acts done in exercise of power of the municipal corporation for its own benefit, or for benefit of its citizens alone, or citizens of the municipal corporation and its immediate locality. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist., Wyo., 490 P.2d 1069, 1070. Quasi municipal corporations. Bodies politic and corporate, created for the sole purpose of performing one or more municipal functions. Public corporations organized for governmental purposes and having for most purposes the status and powers of municipal corporations (such as counties, townships, school districts, drainage districts, irrigation districts, etc.), but not municipal corporations proper, such as cities and incorporated towns. — Black's Law Dictionary, 1979
PAROL (more properly, parole. A French word, which means, literally, word, or speech). A term used to distinguish contracts which are made verbally, or in writing not under seal, which are called parol contracts, from those which are under seal, which bear the name of deeds or specialties .... It is proper to remark that when a contract is made under seal, and afterwards it is modified verbally, it becomes wholly a parol contract .... — Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1889
SOCIAL CONTRACT, or COMPACT, a theory of the origin of human society, first formulated in systematic manner by the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (q.v.). According to Hobbes, men lived originally in a state of nature and enjoyed the right to act as they chose without interference from any source. As this condition of anarchy made life insecure and enabled the strong to dominate the weak, men entered into a compact or contract whereby they submitted voluntarily to necessary limitations on their freedom of action in order to secure the benefits of organized social existence; specifically, they surrendered their right to act as they chose to a sovereign to whom they owed obedience but who was under no obligation to his subjects. Hobbes' theory contained contradictory elements. In positing a social contract as the origin of human society, he synthesized ideas advanced in the latter part of the 16th century and in the 17th
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| The Long and Winding Doctrine:
Social Contract century by various Protestant philosophers and writers who sought a democratic doctrine to oppose the authoritarian theory of the divine right of kings. In postulating an absolute sovereign, however, Hobbes included in his theory the central conception against which the doctrines of his predecessors were directed. In effect, Hobbes' theory was an attempt to adapt democratic ideas to conservative political doctrines; in accordance with his theoretical views, he regarded opposition to the government as a species of treason. In the latter part of the 17th century the philosopher John Locke (q.v.) recast Hobbes' theory in the interest of democratic government. In justifying the Glorious Revolution (q.v.) of 1688 in his Treatise of Civil Government (1690), he made a notable presentation of the theory that in constituting social groups men sought a means of preserving life, liberty, and property; and that the powers they had delegated to government were limited to the achievement of those ends. According to Locke, sovereignty rested in the people. In the 18th century Locke's ideas influenced the thinking of the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau (q.v.) and through Rousseau the leaders of the French Revolution of 1789. Locke's views were also influential in shaping the conceptions of government of the leaders of the American Revolution. — Funk & Wagnalls
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